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Abstract
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nancial
markets (rule of thumb consumers) causes an immediate negative response of output
and employment, which is amplied when the economy faces a lower bound on the
nominal interest rate. Additionally, the paper shows that by supporting consumption
demand, minimum wages might enhance output and employment.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a DSGE model in which a negative bargaining shock leads to lower
employment level through its negative eect on consumption and aggregate demand. This
result stands in contrast with standard New-Keynesian models with search and matching
in which a similar experiment yields opposite results.1 Hence, the paper contributes to
the literature connecting income distribution and business cycle models by showing that
the eects of a bargaining shock on employment depend on the relative strength of the
supply side and demand side transmission channels.
In a DSGE model with search and matching, the split of the surplus between workers
and rms depends on their relative bargaining power. The macroeconomic eects of a
(negative) bargaining shock have been relatively under-studied in the economic modelling
literature2 despite empirical evidence that the labour share of income is subject to short-
term to medium-term deviations from trend (see Blanchard, 1997; ?, for instance). In a
similar line of argument, Figure 1 shows that the labour share of income has declined in
three fourth of the 16 high income countries for which data are available over the period
1960-2010 (see Section 2 for further details). This paper investigates the macroeconomic
eects of short run deviations from trend and refrains from the controversial debate re-
garding the long run properties of the labour share of income.
In standard New Keynesian models with search and matching frictions and bargaining
over income distribution a decline in the labour share of income increases output and
employment. The main reason is that lower wages increase labour demand by rms. Since
the surplus from an additional match accruing to rms increases, they have an incentive
to post more vacancies. A strong supply side eect follows, raising output. Additionally,
changes in the income distribution have no eect on consumption and saving decisions
1Examples of standard New-Keynesian models with search and matching includes Shimer (2005),
Ravenna and Walsh (2008), Gertler and Trigari (2009), Sala et al. (2008).
2Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) look at the properties of the labour share related to bargaining in the
long run rather than temporary bargaining shocks. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) is an exception although
they consider nancial eects and crisis events.
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since the representative household receives both labour and prot income.
The model presented in this paper shows that a slight alteration of the standard
New-Keynesian model produces opposite conclusions. This paper undertakes three main
changes, which magnify aggregate demand channels.
First, the model creates a channel between income distribution and consumption /
saving decisions using household heterogeneity. A rst type of household is optimizing
and makes consumption, saving and investment decisions to smooth inter-temporal con-
sumption based on its permanent income. Additionally, a second type of household, called
rule-of-thumb household, has no access to nancial markets, and thus no saving or borrow-
ing. This household relies exclusively on labour income when employed or the replacement
wage when unemployed.
Mankiw (2000) calls for the introduction of rule of thumb households in macroeconomic
models, arguing that consumption smoothing is far from perfect and that many people in
fact have net worth near zero. Consequently, this idea has been introduced in mainstream
economic models by many authors to discuss the eects of scal policy (see for example
Gal et al., 2007; Cogan et al., 2010). Bosca et al. (2011) recently have combined rule
of thumb households and search and matching, although they utilize a exible price set-
up. They underline that the combination of the two mechanisms better accounts for the
characteristics of the US labour market. The literature on rule of thumb households has
not addressed the question of bargaining shocks to the exception of Kumhof and Ranciere
(2010).
Second, the paper introduces the possibility of a liquidity trap implemented with a
lower bound on the nominal interest rate, as in Christiano et al. (2009). In a liquidity
trap, a shortage of demand, causing deation, cannot be met by a fall in the nominal
interest rate. As a result, the real interest rate rises, further lowering consumption and
investment demand. This paper shows that the negative aggregate demand eect caused
by lower workers' bargaining power far outweighs the positive supply eects in a liquidity
trap. Section 5 shows that the mechanism underlined in this paper are also relevant in
the absence of a lower zero bound. However, the liquidity trap amplies the mechanism
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at work.
Third, the model assumes a CES production function, which encompasses both Cobb-
Douglas as well as Leontief production functions. In the short run, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between labour and capital is rather low. This implies that a decline in wages
does not trigger a large increase in labour demand. This eect both enhances uctuations
in the labour share of income as well as reduces the size of the transmission channel going
from wages to labour demand.
Finally, the relevance of the feedback between incomes and demand is underlined by
conducting an experiment where a lower oor on real wages is introduced. Such a oor
can be motivated by the downward rigidity of nominal wages, or by policy action in the
form of a minimum wage. Under such circumstances, the drop in employment induced
by lower bargaining power is actually less severe since aggregate demand does not fall as
strong.
This paper relates to three dierent strands in the literature. The literature of DSGE
models with search and matching rarely considers bargaining shocks and reaches opposite
conclusions than those highlighted in this paper. A second strand analyses the impact
of the functional income distribution on the probability of crises. Kumhof and Ranciere
(2010) for instance investigate the eects of a fall in workers' bargaining power, and thus
a shift in the income distribution, on household indebtedness. In contrast to this paper,
they disregard the employment eects associated with lower wages by assuming constant
employment inputs in the production function. A last strand of the literature considers
the long run properties of the labour share of income rather than temporary shocks on the
bargaining power of workers (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) or Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(2003)).
The next section reviews empirical evidence on the time series properties of the func-
tional income distribution. Section 3 presents the mathematical derivation of the model
used. Section 4 outlines the calibration strategy used, while Section 5 presents the simu-
lation results. Finally, the last Section concludes.
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2 Trends in the labour share of income
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in the labour share of income, which has taken place in the
majority of 16 high income countries for which data exist over the period 1960-2010. Data
are taken from the AMECO database. The adjusted wage share is dened as percentage of
GDP at current factor cost (Compensation per employee as percentage of GDP at factor
cost per person employed.) The decline has been gradual and continuous in 11 out of 16
countries over the period 1960-2010. The largest drop took place in Ireland, Japan and
Austria with an annual growth decline of -0.54 percent, -0.38 percent and -0.38 percent
respectively. Italy, Norway and Finland displays declines around -0.30 percent annual,
while the USA and Canada are close to -0.2 percent. More moderate declines took place
in France -0.17 and Sweden -0.10. Interestingly, this decline has mainly taken place over
the past two decades. In Australia and the Netherlands, the labour share is constant but
displays a large increase in the 1970's and a long correction thereafter. Contrastingly, in
Denmark and the UK, the labour share has been uctuating around a constant trend.
Lastly, Belgium is the sole country in which the labour share has been increasing at an
annual rate of 0.17 percent.
[Figure 1 about here.]
These relatively large uctuations in the labour share of income conrm existing stud-
ies. Blanchard (1997) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for instance make a similar
analysis and point to labour market rigidities as a source of these uctuations.3 However,
this result is not consensual since Kaldor (1955) predicted that the labour share is constant
around 65%. Picketty (2001) for instance makes a similar statement based on long term
time series. Contrastingly, Solow (1958) argues that while constant at the aggregate level,
the wage share displays excessive uctuations at the sectoral level. Recently, a similar
analysis has been conducted on US data by Young (2010).
Measurement diculties are a reason to explain the absence of a consensus on the
trends in the labour share of income. A rst issue is the treatment of quasi public ad-
3See Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) for a similar analysis.
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ministration and the nancial sector in measuring the value added. A second issue is the
contribution of stock options and the income of the self-employed in the compensation of
labour. Askenazy (2003) shows for instance that correcting for the self-employed as well
as for quasi public administration aects the trends in the labour share signicantly in
France and the USA.
This paper does not intend to engage in the debate of the long run properties of the
labour share. However, since the under-shooting in the labour share is a short to medium
run phenomena, it raises the question of the economic consequence of this deviation on
aggregate demand and economic activity.
Theoretically, two fundamentally dierent explanations for the fall in the labour share
exist. The rst claims that technological progress favored capital return, while the second
identies institutional changes as the cause of this development. All explanations require
a departure from the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution in the production
function, which is usually made in RBC models. Choi and Rios-Rull (2009) and Arpaia
et al. (2009) study the importance of the elasticity of substitution  between factors of
production on their relative shares.4 Institutional factors explaining a changing labour
share can range from lower unionization rates to globalization pressure, but are usually
modelled as a fall in worker's bargaining power.5 This paper utilizes a general constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function as well as a labour market featuring
4Choi and Rios-Rull (2009) show that an elasticity of substitution below unity ( = 0:75 in their model)
is required for a DSGE model to qualitatively reproduce empirical cyclical wage share properties in response
to technology shocks. In contrast, Arpaia et al. (2009) take the presence of low- and high-skilled labour
into account when investigating the impact of technical change and changes in the relative composition in
the labour force.
5Berthold et al. (2002) model putty-clay technology and capital, thereby featuring low substitutability
between capital and labour in the short run and high substitutability in the long run. Under these
assumptions, a fall in workers' bargaining power will temporarily reduce the labour share. Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) focus on rm entry costs and show that lower bargaining power, through raising
employment, raises the number of rms and thereby competition in the market, thus lowering the price
markup. By abstracting from aspects of technology and factor substitution, they establish that the labour
share will ultimately be related to frictional costs, like entry costs, imposed on rms.
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bargaining over wages and employment. As such, this model allows both for technological
as well as institutional factors to aect the labour share of income.
3 Model
3.1 Households' heterogeneity and aggregate quantities
There are two types of households, optimizing households denoted by subscript o and rule
of thumb households denoted by subscript r. We dene the total number of households,
consumption, employment and total labour endowment (labour supply) of each household
type as i, Ci;t, Ni;t and Li for i = [o; r], respectively. The total aggregate quantities are
then given by the sums of these, thus Ct = Co;t + Cr;t and the equivalents.
Consumption per household ct =
Ct
 is then given by
ct = cco;t + (1  c)cr;t; (1)
where c =
o
 is the share of optimizing consumers in the total population, and ci;t =
Ci;t
i
for i = [o; r]. We assume that each household has a maximum labour endowment
of unity. We also assume that rule of thumb households fully use their labour endowment,
thus Lr = r. For optimizing consumers, we assume that their labour supply can be
a fraction , thus Lo = o.
6 This allows the model to encompass dierent cases. The
standard rule-of-thumb set-up as presented in Gal et al. (2007) corresponds to  = 1. The
polarized case where optimizing households are capitalists and rule of thumb households
are workers as in Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) is given by  = 0. The standard New
Keynesian model with a single optimizing households is achieved by assuming c =  = 1.
The employment rate nt =
Nt
L is given by
nt =nno;t + (1  n)nr;t; (2)
where n =
c
p
is the share of optimizing consumers in the workforce and p = 1 (1 )c.
6We set this fraction exogenously. A model extension could have this value be determined endogenously,
for example as a function of wealth.
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When  = 1, then n = c and p = 1. The aggregate employment per household is given
by Nt = pnt
Since only optimizing households hold a capital stock, per household investment and
capital stock are dened as
xt =cxo;t (3)
kt =cko;t (4)
3.2 Labour Market Flows
In the model presented in this paper, all households face equal probabilities of nding
or loosing a job. Hence, we specify the labour market ows in aggregate quantities only.
All workers not working in a period are unemployed and looking for a job. The pool of
unemployed (relative to the labour force L) is given by ut = 1 nt 1. Unemployed workers
can be matched to a job and start working immediately in that period. The matching
function (again specied as relative to the labour force L) is mt = mu

t v
1 
t , where mt
are new matches, vt are posted vacancies,  is the elasticity of matching to unemployed
workers and m is the overall matching eciency.
Three denitions are used to describe the labour market: the probability of lling a
vacancy, qt = mt=vt, the job nding probability pt = mt=ut and labour market tightness
t =
vt
1 nt . The model assumes quadratic employment adjustment cost n;tht following
Gertler and Trigari (2009), which are specied in terms of the hiring rate ht =
mt
nt 1 .
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Jobs separation probability is 1  . Employment at t is given by the remaining stock
of workers plus new matches.
nt = nt 1 + qtvt (6)
Thus, workers that were employed at t   1 and who loosed their job are immediately in
7The functional form used is as in Gertler and Trigari (2009)
n;t =

2
h2tnt 1 (5)
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the pool of unemployed and are able to nd a job in period t again. The probability of
lling a vacancy, qt and the job nding probability pt are given by:
qt =m

1  nt 1
vt

(7)
pt =m

vt
1  nt 1
1 
(8)
3.3 Households
Optimizing and rule of thumb households maximize their inter-temporal utility function
maxUi;t =
1X
j=0
t+ju(ci;t+j) for i = [o; r]; (9)
where  is the time discount factor and the period utility function u(ci;t) is dened as
u(ci;t) =
(ci;t   hci;t 1)1 i
1  i for i = [o; r]:
Period utility includes habit persistence, governed by the parameter h. Both types of
households face the employment dynamics constraint.
ni;t = ni;t 1 + pt(1  ni;t 1) for i = [o; r]: (10)
3.3.1 Rule of Thumb Households
Rule of thumb households do not have access to nancial markets. Therefore, their budget
constraint is given by their labour income plus their unemployment benet payments wu.
cr;t  wtnr;t + wu(1  nr;t); (11)
The household maximizes its utility (9) subject to the employment and budget con-
straints, (10) and (11). The consumption of rule of thumb households is given by their
budget constraint (eq 11), which is always binding. Furthermore, the marginal utility of
consumption r;t (the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint) is given by
r;t = (cr;t   hcr;t 1) r   h(cr;t+1   hcr;t) r (12)
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The rst derivative of the utility function Ur;t with respect to nr;t yields
Vr;t = r;t(wt   wu) + Et [Vr;t+1(  pt+1)] ;
where Vr;t is the Lagrange multiplier on the employment dynamics constraint (10), and
can thus be interpreted as the marginal utility value of a job to a household. It is useful
to dene the value of a job in terms of a consumption good, thus we dene Hnr;t =
Vr;t
r;t
.
We then obtain
Hnr;t =wt   wu + Et

rt;t+1 (  pt+1)Hnr;t+1

; (13)
where rt;t+1 =
r;t+1
r;t
is the stochastic discount factor for rule of thumb consumers.
3.3.2 Optimizing Consumers
Like rule of thumb households, optimizing households also earn labour income and un-
employment benets. These quantities have to be scaled by the relative labour market
participation  when expressing in per-household terms. Additionally, they can invest in
bonds paying a gross nominal interest rate Rn;t. When Bo;t is the total nominal quantity
of bonds held by optimizing households, then bo;t =
Bo;t
Pto
is the real stock of bonds per
optimizing household. Finally, they can accumulate physical capital ko;p;t subject to the
accumulation function
ko;p;t = (1  )ko;p;t 1 + xo;t(1  k;t); (14)
where k;t are investment adjustment costs.
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Optimizing households are allowed to vary the usage of physical capital by the factor
uk;t, to earn a return uk;trk;t on their physical capital stock. There is a cost =(uk;t)
associated with capacity over- or under-utilization.9 Actual capital is determined by
ko;t =uk;tko;p;t 1 (15)
8Capital adjustment costs follow the usual specication k;t =
k
2

xo;t
xo;t 1   1
2
, so that k = 0 at the
steady state.
9The functional form is =(uk;t) = rk 

e (uk;t 1)   1

, so that =(1) = 0 and @=(uk;t)
@uk;t
> 0.
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The budget constraint of optimizing households is given by
co;t + xo;t + bo;t + =(uk;t)ko;p;t 1
 wtno;t + wu(1  no;t) + rk;tuk;tko;p;t 1 + Rn;t 1
t
bo;t 1   o;t +t; (16)
where t are prot receipts from rms, t =
Pt
Pt 1 is the gross price ination rate and Pt
is the aggregate price level.
The household maximizes its utility (9) subject to the employment dynamics con-
straint (10), the capital accumulation (14) and the budget constraint (16). We dene
the Lagrange multipliers on the employment constraint as Vo (thus the marginal value of
a job), the budget constraint as o (thus the marginal utility of consumption), and the
capital accumulation constraint as k (thus the marginal utility value of a unit of capital).
Dening 't =
k;t
o;t
(Tobin's q), the rst order conditions are given by
o;t = (co;t   hco;t 1) o   h(co;t+1   hco;t) o (17)
ot;t+1 =
1

t+1
Rn;t
(18)
't = Et
 
ot;t+1 [rk;t+1uk;t+1  =(uk;t+1) + 't+1 (1  )]

(19)
't =
1  Et

't+1
o
t;t+1

xot+1
xot
2 
xt+1
xt
  1

1 

t +
xot
xot 1
k

xt
xt 1   1
 (20)
rk;t = rke
 (uk;t 1) (21)
Vo;t = o;t(wt   wu) + Et [Vo;t+1(  pt+1)] ;
where ot;t+1 =
o;t+1
o;t
is the stochastic discount factor for optimizing households.
Similarly to rule of thumb households, we dene the value of a job in terms of a
consumption good Hno;t =
Vo;t
o;t
. We then obtain
Hno;t =wt   wu + Et

ot;t+1 (  pt+1)Hno;t+1

;
3.4 The Wholesale Good Firm
Wholesale good rms produce output using capital and labour using a production function
of the form Y wt = F (Kt; Nt). We specify a CES production function, which is homogeneous
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of degree one. Therefore, output per household can be expressed as
ywt =
h
(Bkkt)
 1
 + (1  )(Bnpnt)
 1

i 
 1
; (22)
where  is the elasticity of substitution, Bk and Bn are technology (scaling) parameters
and  is a share parameter. The Cobb-Douglas case occurs when  = 1.
The rm maximizes its value Ft, expressed as per household, by selling output at the
real price pwt ,
10 renting capital kt at price rk;t, and hiring labour nt at price wt, subject
to the dynamic equation governing employment as well as the quadratic employment
adjustment cost. The value is given by
Ft = p
w
t y
w
t   wtpnt  

2
h2tnt 1   rkt kt + Et

ot;t+1Ft+1

; (23)
where ot;t+1 is also the rms' discount factor as they are owned by optimizing households.
The rst order conditions with respect to k, h and n (where we do not evaluate @h=@n as
each rm is small) are given, in that order, by
rk = p
w
t  (Bk)
 1


ywt
kt
 1

(24)
ht = Jt (25)
Jt = p
w
t a
n
t   pwt + Et
h
ot;t+1

2
h2t+1
i
+ Et

ot;t+1Jt+1

(26)
ant = (1  )
 
zn;tBnk

g;tp
  1


ywt
nt
 1

(27)
The marginal productivity of labour is given by an. Jt is the Lagrange multiplier on
the "budget" constraint of employment dynamics (6), and thus can be interpreted as the
marginal value to the rm of having another worker.
3.5 Bargaining
Firms and workers engage in Nash Bargaining over the joint surplus, the outcome of which
is the wage wt . t is the workers relative bargaining power and is time dependant since
the experiment considered in this paper is a temporary shock on t.
10Section 3.7 species pwt .
12
wt  max
n
(Ht)
t (Jt)
1 t
o
; 0 < t < 1 (28)
The bargaining solution implies tJt = (1  t)Ht, where the aggregate worker surplus
is given as a weighted average of the individual surpluses according to their share in the
labour force, Ht = nHno;t + (1  n)Hnr;t.
The bargaining set, the total surplus, is given by St = wt   wt, where wt is the
maximum wage when rms' surplus Jt = 0, and wt is the minimum wage when workers
surplus Ht = 0. The negotiated wage is the weighted average of these reservation wages,
wt = t wt + (1  t)wt. By substituting Jt =  qtvtnt 1 , we obtain
wt =t
1
p
pwt a
n
t + (1  t)wu + t
1
b
Et

Jt+1
o
t;t+1pt+1
	
+ t
1
p
Et
n
ot;t+1

2
(ht+1)
2
o
+ t

1
p
  1
b

Et

ot;t+1Jt+1

+ (1  t) 1  n
b
Et

Hnr;t+1(  pt+1)(ot;t+1   rt;t+1)
	
(29)
Hall (2005) demonstrates that real wage stickiness greatly improves the ability of a
search and matching model to match empirical employment dynamics. For this reason,
we follow him by utilizing the following wage rule
wt =wwt 1 + (1  w)wt (30)
The actual wage is a weighted average between the Nash bargained wage and the past
period's wage.
3.6 The Final Goods Firm
The nal good (expressed per household), yt, is produced in a competitive market accord-
ing to the following CES technology:
yt =
Z 1
0
y
1

i;tdi

  1 (31)
where each input yi;t is a dierentiated intermediate good. The term
1
1  indicates the
price elasticity of the demand for any intermediate good i. Each period, nal goods
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producers choose a continuum of dierentiated intermediate goods, yi;t at price Pi;t, to
maximize their prots subject to the CES technology (31). The demand function for
intermediate goods can be derived as follow:
yi;t =

Pi;t
Pt
 
1 
yt (32)
3.7 Intermediate Good Firms
Intermediate good rms purchase homogeneous goods from the wholesale sector and re-
label them to produce dierentiated goods. These dierentiated goods are then sold in
a monopolistic competitive market to the nal good rms. Furthermore, we assume that
intermediate good rms are subject to price stickiness, whereby a fraction  cannot reset
its price in a certain period and set price Pt 1.
The aggregate price Pt is given by P
 
1 
t = P
 
1 
t 1 + (1   ) ~P
 
1 
t , where
~Pt is the
aggregate reset price. Normalizing this equations by Pt, we get:
1 =

1 
t + (1  )~p

1 
t (33)
where ~pt =
~Pt
Pt
is the "real" optimized reset price.
Firms being able to optimize choose price ~Pt by maximizing their discounted stream
of real prots.
max
~Pt
Et
1X
s=0
()sot;t+s
"
~Pt
Pt+s
  pwt+s
#
yi;t+s (34)
subject to the demand equation (32). pwt represents the (real) purchasing price of wholesale
goods, and thus the marginal costs.
The rst order condition is
f1;t =
1

f2;t (35)
where
f1;t =(~pt)

1  ytp
w
t + t;t+1
 
1  1
t+1

~pt
~pt+1
 
1 
f1;t+1 (36)
f2;t =(~pt)
1
1  yt + t;t+1
 
1 
t+1

~pt
~pt+1
 1
1 
f2;t+1 (37)
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Firms set their price not at the current optimal level but at the level they deem optimal
over the expected lifetime of their set price. In the presence of ination, this means that
rms having reset their price earlier will have a lower relative price than rms that just
reset their price, and will therefore have a higher share of aggregate demand. This means
that there will be ineciencies due to price dispersion, denoted with the symbol st. The
quantity available for aggregate demand, yt, is not necessarily equal to the quantity from
the per rm production function ywt , but only a fraction
1
st
of it. Hence, we have the
relationships
ywt =styt (38)
st =(1  )~p
  1
1 
t + 
1
1 
t st 1 (39)
In steady state the optimal reset price will be given by 1 = p
w. Thus, rms set price
as a mark-up on nominal marginal costs.
3.8 Policies and resource constraint
Due to the lower zero bound on monetary policy, the interest rate set by the Central Bank
is the maximum of the interest rate as determined by a Taylor rule, Rnt , and zero.
Rnt = max [R
n
t ; 0] (40)
The procedure for the introduction of a lower bound on a variable into a stochastically
simulated model in Dynare is described in Holden (2011).
The Taylor rule sets the interest rate according to a criteria of interest rate smoothing,
and measures of ination and output. m is the parameter driving the Taylor rule inertia,
while  and y are the parameters setting the response of the interest rate to ination
and output.
Rnt
Rn
=

Rnt 1
Rn
m (t

 yt
y
y)1 m
(41)
The government pays unemployment benets and nances these using lump sum taxes
on optimizing households, which is thus equivalent to debt nancing.11 Therefore, rule of
11o;t = wu (1  nr;t + (1  no;t))
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thumb households are not subjected to cyclical tax uctuations. The resource constraint
is given by summing the budget constraints of both type of households (11), (16) as well
as the prot equation of rms.
yt =ct + xt +

2
q2t v
2
t
nt 1
+ =(uk;t)cko;p;t 1 (42)
Finally, the exogenous process subjected to a shock t in this paper is t, which evolves
according to the autoregressive process
t = (1  ) + t 1 + t (43)
3.9 Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium consists in processes for the ow variables [y; yw; c; co; cr; x; xo; an],
the stock variables [n; no; nr; k; ko; ko;p], the prices [Rn; rk; '; uk; w; w
; pw; ; ~p; p; f1; f2; s],
the labour market rates [q; v; p] and the utility and discount rates [J;Hr; o;
o; r;
r]
, given the structural parameters [c; ; 
o; r; ; ;  ; k; h], the labour market param-
eters [; ; m; ; w], the production parameters [;Bk; Bn; ], the pricing parameters
[; 1; 2], the policy parameters [wu; m; ; y; r; o] and the exogenous process [; ]
satisfying the equilibrium conditions given by equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (10), (7),
(8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (24), (25), (26), (27), (29),
(30), (33), (35), (36), (37), (38), (39), (41), (42) and (43) and the denitions it;t+1 =
i;t+1
i;t
for i = [o; r].
4 Steady State and Parameterisation
The steady state of the model is given when all variables are constant over time. In
principle, the steady state can be solved given all structural parameters. In practice, it
is usual procedure to calibrate target values for certain variables and derive structural
parameters from these.
First, this paper calibrates a zero ination steady state and normalizes the price level
to unity. Next, this paper calibrates the job separation rate , the job nding rate p and
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labour market tightness  to match empirically observed values, and uses these to derive
the structural parameters m and . Furthermore, it is useful with CES production func-
tions to normalize steady state output to unity. This requires the technology parameters
Bk and Bn to be computed as the inverse of the steady states of the factors of production,
k and n. These steady state values are easily derived using knowledge of the real interest
rate (given the discount parameter ) and the job separation and nding rate.
Table 1 shows the parameter calibration used for the numerical simulations carried out
further below. The parameters are essentially taken from Gertler and Trigari (2009), who
estimated a similar model for the US economy. The relative risk aversion is identical for
both households o = r and is set at 1. It follows that the utility function takes the form
of a logarithmic function. The time discount factor  is set at 0.992, generating an annual
interest rate of 3.2%. Capital depreciates at a rate of 2.5% per quarter, which corresponds
to 10% annual rate of depreciation. The investment adjustment cost curvature has been
estimated to k = 2:5 by Sala et al. (2008) for the US economy, while Christiano et al.
(2011) estimate a value of k = 14:3. We select k = 11 and the cost of capacity utilization
is set at 0.5.
The parameters of the labour market are conventional and taken from Shimer (2005).
The job surviving rate  is set at 90%, while the job nding probability p and the labour
market tightness are equal to 0.95 and 0.5 at the steady state respectively. The elasticity
of matching to unemployed workers  is 0.5. An important parameter in search and
matching models is the replacement ratio !. In models without strong wage stickiness,
a high value is needed to generate realistic employment uctuations. Gertler and Trigari
(2009) estimate this value to be 0:72 in a model with wage stickiness and 0:98 in a model
without wage stickiness. We choose an intermediate value ! = 0:9. Since restrictions are
placed on two variables p and , the steady states for labour market variables are found by
solving endogenously for the two parameters m, the eciency of the matching function,
and , the employment adjustment cost. They are respectively equal to 1:345 and 0:6572.
These parameters produce an employment rate n slightly more than 90% at the steady
state. Finally, wage rigidity is moderate with w = 0:3.
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[Table 1 about here.]
The capital share  is set at 0.3 and  is set at 1.11 for a mark up of 11%, generating a
labour share of income of 63% at the steady state. The coecient Bk and Bn are equal to
0.1223 and 1.3003 respectively, which corresponds to the inverse of the steady state value
of the capital stock and employment in order to normalize the CES production function.
The set of parameters related to nominal price rigidities is conventional. 80% of rms are
unable to adjust their price to the optimal price every period. Monetary policy inertia m
is set at 0.8, while the reaction of the interest rate to ination and output are 1.7 and 0.2
respectively.
Lastly, we conduct the experiment of temporarily lowering the bargaining power of
workers from  = 0:5 to  = 0:475, with a persistence of  = 0:9. Due to the absence of
evidence on uctuations in bargaining power, the size of the shock was chosen to generate
plausible variations in wages and the labour share. As such, the size of the impact of the
shocks in the dierent cases presented should be compared relative to each other, as the
absolute values will change when assuming smaller or larger shocks.
We dene the baseline model when optimizing households' participation in the labour
market is given by  = 0:5 to reect the fact that part of the population actually only
receives capital income. The share of rule of thumb households (1  c) is 50% as in Gal
et al. (2007). Furthermore, the production function assumes a lower degree of substitution
between labour and capital,  = 0:6, an intermediate value between the Cobb-Douglas case
 = 1 and the Leontief case  = 0. To simulate a standard New Keynesian model, we set
the share of optimizing households and the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour to unity (c = 1,  = 1,  = 1). We also consider another extreme case where all
optimizing households are identied as capitalists, thus not earning labour income ( = 0).
5 Results
This section presents the simulated results of a fall in workers' bargaining power using the
model described in this paper. First, the eect of such a shock is described in the baseline
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calibration with and without a lower nominal interest rate bound and compared to its
eect in a standard New Keynesian model. The main nding is that the conclusion from
a standard New Keynesian model, where lower bargaining power raises employment, is
overturned when demand eects of wages are taken into account. Next, some sensitivity
analysis to alternative parameter calibrations is conducted. Finally, the impact of the
presence of a minimum wage in response to such a shock is analysed, showing that such a
minimum wages, by supporting labour incomes, actually raises employment and output.
The gures for output, consumption and investment below represent percentage point
deviations in terms of GDP, which in turn is normalized to one in steady state. Ination,
employment and the labour share are represented as percentage point deviations of their
respective rates.
5.1 Baseline results
The solid line in Figure 2 shows a standard New Keynesian model with search and matching
frictions, where the baseline calibration of Table 1 is altered to have only optimizing
consumers (c = 1 and  = 1) and the production function is Cobb-Douglas ( = 1).
The dashed line represents the baseline calibration of Table 1. The dotted-dashed line
additionally takes into account that the nominal interest rate can hit a lower bound in
response to the fall in workers' bargaining power. Specically, the interest rate is allowed
to fall by 0:32 percentage points before hitting the bound, which represents well the current
economic circumstances of very low interest rates.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The fall in bargaining power raises output, consumption, employment and investment
in the standard New Keynesian model, while it lowers the labour share and ination. In
contrast, output, consumption and employment initially fall in the baseline model. In
the presence of a lower interest rate bound these falls are much more pronounced, with
employment falling by 0:8% and staying below its initial level for 5 quarters. Additionally,
the fall in the labour share of income and in ination are much more pronounced.
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Two mechanisms are at work. The rst mechanism is common to the baseline and the
New Keynesian model. The fall in workers' bargaining power lowers real wages, which in
turn implies a fall in marginal costs and thus ination. Firms' surplus from employment
relationships rises, thus increasing vacancies, the number of matches, employment and
output. However, the labour share of income falls despite the rise in employment since
employment adjusts only sluggishly. Additionally, countercyclical mark-ups implied by
New Keynesian price stickiness cause a rise in the prots, which add to the fall in the
labour share of income.
The model presented in this paper takes a second mechanism, the aggregate demand
eect from the fall in labour income, into account. By lowering labour incomes, consump-
tion demand from rule-of-thumb consumers falls, which causes a reduction in employment
and output despite the positive supply side eect from lower labour costs. However, Figure
2 shows that the supply side eect quickly overturns the demand side eect, with output
rising above its original level after 2 quarters. Nevertheless, the labour share falls fur-
ther than in the standard New Keynesian model since a lower elasticity of substitution in
production implies a relatively smaller rise in labour demand in response to lower wages.
When the economy faces a lower bound on the nominal interest rate, negative aggregate
demand shocks can be strongly aggravated. This paper shows that the same holds for a
negative demand shock induced by a fall in workers' bargaining power. Lower demand
lowers ination. However, in the presence of a lower bound, the nominal interest rate
cannot fall further, thus raising the real interest rate. This in turn lowers investment and
consumption demand by optimizing households. The economy faces a deationary spiral.
The positive supply side eect from lower bargaining power is overturned by its negative
demand side eect.
Summarizing, a negative bargaining shock induces negative aggregate demand eects
when one accounts for the importance of labour income for certain parts of households.
When the economy faces a lower bound on the interest rate, as it does in situations of
crises, this negative demand eect causes a strong fall in employment and output. This
result stands in stark contrast to a standard New Keynesian model, where a fall in wage
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income only triggers a supply side eect, raising vacancy posting, employment and output.
Accordingly, policy conclusions advising wage moderation in times of crisis might have to
be reconsidered.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
This section presents some sensitivity analysis to illustrate the importance of the dierent
transmission channels at work in the baseline calibration. Figure 3 presents the sensitivity
analysis concerning the impact of the income distribution as a driver of aggregate demand.
The solid line shows the baseline calibration with a lower interest rate bound as presented
above. The dashed line shows a calibration of limited labour market participation, where
optimizing households behave purely as capitalists and do not participate in the labour
market ( = 0). As a result, a larger share of total consumption cannot be smoothed
intertemporally.12 A fall in bargaining power therefore leads to a larger fall in aggregate
demand, and consequently to a more severe depression of economic activity. Furthermore,
the model is moved closer to an instability region, thus producing a kink in the dynamic
path of the variables.
The dashed-dotted line represents the case where there are no rule-of-thumb consumers,
thus there is no demand eect from changes in the functional income distribution (c = 1
and  = 1). However, the case still allows for the economy to be facing a liquidity trap.
In this case, the increase in aggregate saving described above, combined with the fall in
ination, do not boost investment but cause the lower bound on the nominal interest rate
to be binding. Compared to the baseline model, the absence of income distribution eects
on aggregate demand diminishes the importance of the lower bound.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 shows that the mechanisms introduced by this paper, the importance of the
income of workers to support aggregate demand, induces a fall in output and employment
after a fall in bargaining power even in the absence of a liquidity trap. The calibration
12The steady state wage share is more or less xed due to our calibration strategy.
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has been changed to have a low elasticity of substitution ( = 0:1) and no lower bound on
monetary policy.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The solid line in Figure 4 shows that output and employment fall somewhat stronger on
impact than shown in the dashed line in Figure 2. Due to the low elasticity of substitution,
the fall in bargaining power has a stronger eect on the labour share, which, coupled
with price stickiness and the impossibility of consumption smoothing, induces a stronger
negative demand eect. In the absence of a liquidity trap, the nominal interest rate
falls with ination leading to a decline in the real interest rate. It follows that both
labour demand and investment react positively. The speed at which output recovers is
partly determined by the existence of capital adjustment costs, which delays investment
decisions. Monetary policy shortens the recession by stimulating both supply and demand
channels.
The dashed line in Figure 4 corresponds to a case in which there is no participation of
optimizing households to the labour market  = 0. This polarized distribution of income
between workers and optimizing households amplies the wage-aggregate demand channel.
Output declines by 0.7 percentage point and stays negative for 3 quarters. The fall in the
labour share is also more pronounced at 0.54 percentage points.
The dashed doted line in Figure 4 shows the importance of nominal price rigidities.
The transmission channel between lower consumption demand and output depends on
the presence of price stickiness. Increasing price rigidity from 5 quarters to 8 quarters
( = 0:875) magnies the demand side eects (dotted-dashed line). The fall in worker's
bargaining power lowers the labour share further. Output and employment drop by 0.9
percentage point and 0.7 percentage points on impact respectively, while they both stay
negative for 4 quarters.
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5.3 Minimum wage as a lower bound on wages
Figure 2 has illustrated the importance of labour income for aggregate demand in the
proximity of the lower zero bound in monetary policy. The transmission channel going
from labour income to aggregate demand modies the traditional views on a minimum
wage. In a standard New-Keynesian model, the minimum wage is seen as hampering the
downward adjustment in wages. This in turn limits labour demand of rms and amplies
business cycle uctuations. Contrastingly, in the present model, the minimum wage sets
a lower oor on labour income, which sustains consumption and aggregate demand. The
direct negative eect of the minimum wage on labour demand is balanced by its positive
impact on aggregate demand.
In this section, minimum wage is modelled in a similar way than the lower zero bound
in monetary policy. The actual wage is the maximum between the wage rule (eq 30) and
the minimum wage.
wt = max [w
r
t ; wmin] (44)
with wt the actual wage, w
r
t the wage according to the wage rule in (30) and wmin the
minimum wage. The bound is set at 0:5 percent below the steady state wage.
Figure 5 reproduces the baseline simulation under the lower interest rate bound with
(dashed line) and without a minimum wage (solid line) using the baseline calibration of
Table 1. The main result is that the minimum wage reduces the size of the recession
following a decline in the bargaining power of workers. The minimum wage reduces the
drop in output from 1.2 percentage points to 0.4 percentage points on impact. The drop
in the labour share of income is also smaller, 0.28 percentage points compared to 0.70
percentage points on impact. It follows that the drop in consumption is signicantly lower
than in the absence of a lower bound on wages, sustaining aggregate demand. A secondary
eect is related to the adjustment in price. Since ination declines less in the presence of
the minimum wage, the increase in the real interest rate is more moderate, which is less
detrimental to investment and labour demand.
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[Figure 5 about here.]
6 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper shows that under certain conditions a fall in workers'
bargaining power leads to lower employment and output. This result stands in contrast
with the conclusion from a standard New Keynesian model, which nds virtue to wage
moderation. The model reinforces the transmission channel from income distribution to
consumption decisions by combining rule-of-thumb households and nominal price rigidities.
This transmission is strengthened in the presence of a lower zero bound in monetary policy.
In the standard New-Keynesian model, labour demand is the main transmission chan-
nel. The increase in consumption and investment follows from the increase in employment
and permanent income. Contrastingly, the present model takes the importance of labour
income on aggregate demand into account by including rule-of-thumb consumers. Follow-
ing a bargaining power drop, the demand and supply eect work in opposite directions.
When the economy faces a lower interest rate bound, the negative demand eect is much
stronger, thereby causing a signicant fall in output and employment. Consequently, a
minimum wage, by limiting the fall in labour income following a fall in bargaining power,
supports aggregate demand and thereby reduces the fall in output and employment.
Two extensions to the present paper can be envisioned. The rst is to allow workers to
have some access to nancial markets, and thus engage in some limited borrowing. This
allows the study of the eect of inequality on household indebtedness, thereby following
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010). Second, the extension to a two country model allows to
study a number of research questions present on the current political agenda. In an open
economy, a falling wage will additionally raise export demand, depending on the exchange
rate regime. However, such a policy could be a beggar-thy-neighbor policy by raising
unemployment in the foreign country. Furthermore, international imbalances might result.
Given the results obtained in this paper, an interesting addition to the policy debate is
likely to result from these extensions.
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Figures
Figure 1: (adjusted) labour share of income (at factor cost)
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Figure 2: Standard New Keynesian vs baseline model
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Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Income Distribution
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Figure 4: Sensitivity Analysis: CES and Price Stickiness
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Figure 5: Minimum Wage
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Tables
Table 1: Calibration: baseline model
Structural parameters
Share of Optimizing Consumers c = 0:5
Labour market participation of optimizing consumers  = 0:5
Relative risk aversion parameters o = r = 1
Discount factor  = 0:992
Habit persistence h = 0:5
Capital depreciation rate  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost k = 11
Capital utilization cost  = 0:5
Labour market parameters
Exogenous job loss probability 1   = 0:1
Target job nding probability p = 0:95
Labour market tightness  = 0:5
Matching elasticity  = 0:5
Implied matching function parameter m = 1:345
Implied employment adjustment cost  = 0:6605
Implied employment rate n = 0:9048
wage rigidity w = 0:3
Production parameters
Capital share  = 0:3
Elasticity of substitution  = 0:6
Capital technology Bk = 0:1223
Labour technology Bn = 1:3003
Pricing parameters
Price mark-up  = 1:11
Price stickiness  = 0:8
Policy parameters
Replacement rate ! = 0:9
Interest rate smoothing m = 0:8
Ination response  = 1:7
Output response y = 0:2
Bargaining power  = 0:5
Bargaining power auto-regressive coecient  = 0:9
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